Hard Truths about Truth-telling
What I've learned in twenty years since blowing the whistle on the Iraq War
It is twenty years since I resigned from the Foreign Office over the Iraq War. I remember well the day I wrote to the Foreign Secretary, attaching my secret evidence to the Butler Inquiry as the reason. The government had lied about Iraq's WMD (which I had worked on for many years), ignored alternatives to war (which I had advised upon) and had broken the UN resolutions that I had helped negotiate. The Foreign Secretary didn't reply though the Foreign Office did offer me psychological counselling.
I have been reflecting on this experience. My conclusions are harsh:
1. The liars and criminals get away with it. Witness the rehabilitation of Blair and Campbell, those directly responsible. Campbell, I see, is now slated to present Channel Four's general election coverage. Advisers from the Blair Institute work with governments (some not so nice) around the world, and in Keir Starmer's team.
2. The ones who tell the truth pay the price. I lost my career, pay and index-linked pension. When my evidence became public in 2006, I was personally attacked in national media, including by the Foreign Secretary. I was threatened with prosecution under the Official Secrets Act. Former colleagues, some friends, repudiated me. Meanwhile the officials who went along with the lies and kept their mouths shut kept their jobs and prospered. My boss, for instance, knew everything I did but did nothing. Others now have knighthoods and are running ministries or are senior ambassadors.
I am of course bitter about this, but I have worked hard not to let that bitterness guide my life and have used my anger to fuel new ventures. Others, above all the Iraqi people, have suffered far worse. My colleague, the weapons expert David Kelly, died because of the lies.
My greater concern is that the disincentives to blow the whistle on government dishonesty remain immense. The threat of prosecution continues under the draconian Official Secrets Act. Losing your income and profession is a big deal. In this way, government bullies and controls those who might reveal its lies. I am thinking today, for instance, of the Foreign Office legal advice on arms sales to Israel, which the government has refused to reveal. Transparency and thus accountability are the victims.
One thing that can be done is to make it easier to blow the whistle and not force those who do so to pay such a heavy price. I am thinking about this, including the possibility of suing the government, now that my evidence has been vindicated by the Chilcot Iraq Inquiry report, though it is probably too late. I told the truth, the government lied. If you have any thoughts, please share - probably best by direct message or email.
All these years later, I remain glad that I did what I did, difficult though it has sometimes been. I'm not seeking praise (or criticism), just pointing out some hard truths about truth-telling.
Some footnotes (especially for non-Brits)
The Butler Inquiry was the first official inquiry into the Iraq War, but was narrowly focused on the use of intelligence by the government before the war
Alistair Campbell was Blair’s chief of communications who was central to the creation of the government’s claim that Iraq’s WMD posed a threat to the UK, including through the so-called ‘dodgy dossier’ of grossly exaggerated evidence of Iraq’s stocks of weapons. I was part of the process of creating that dossier (and raised doubts about it at the time).
The Chilcot Iraq Inquiry was a much broader and public inquiry into the war conducted some years after the event. The publication of my evidence to Butler triggered calls, including from former PM John Major, for a full public inquiry. I also testified to Chilcot. You can see my evidence in the National Archives here.
My expertise and authority on the Iraq issue derives from the fact that I was the First Secretary in the UK Mission to the UN in New York responsible for the topic at the UN Security Council from 1997-2002 (ie until shortly before the 2003 invasion). I negotiated several resolutions on Iraq, sanctions and weapons inspections. I was deeply steeped in the complexities of the issue, including the intelligence on WMD (what little there was) and was part of all US/UK policy discussions. I was part of the small group of UK officials responsible for Iraq policy in the government for 4 1/2 years.
This is my first post here on Substack. I plan to write about this story as it develops (particularly if I sue the government). But there will be plenty more blogs here about world events and necessary change. If you like this post, please share it along with details of how to subscribe.